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Abstract. Security requirements change, but the typical way of im-
proving system security by patches is ad hoc and has not produced good
results. Security improvements should be systematic, just as new features
can be added to software systematically. It would be easier to improve
the security of a system if we had a catalog of security-oriented program
transformations that could be used to plan changes, to divide the work
to make changes, and as a target of automation. This paper describes a
catalog of security-oriented program transformations that were derived
from security patterns. It describes several ways of categorizing these
transformations, our first attempts at validating the catalog, and how
the catalog can be used to improve the security of systems.
1 Introduction
Security is architectural; it is a property of the entire system, not one part of
it [7]. Security cannot be added to a system by adding a module, but it can be
added in other ways. In particular, it is possible to improve the security of a
system by applying program transformations to the existing code base.
When a system starts to show security vulnerabilities, its owners are faced
with the choice of replacing it or ﬁxing it. Replacing the system can be expen-
sive and risky, so usually the choice is to ﬁx it. But the most common approach
to ﬁxing security vulnerabilities is to patch them, i.e. to ﬁx each instance of a
vulnerability separately. Users see a constant stream of patches, leading security
experts to claim that it is not possible to add security to existing systems [1] [23]
or at least it is economically infeasible to do so [3]. However, this is surely an
exaggeration. Even if it is more expensive to retroﬁt security to a system than
to design it in from the beginning, it will be even more expensive to rewrite a
system from scratch each time a new type of vulnerability appears. Any large
software system is constructed incrementally; one feature is added before an-
other, and components are split and recombined. There is no obvious reason
why techniques that are used on new system cannot be retroﬁtted to an existing
system, especially if these techniques can be automated. Verifying this obser-
vation requires making a list of all techniques for making systems secure and
checking that each of them can be retroﬁtted to an existing system.
We have studied the available security solutions and collected them in a cat-
alog of techniques that ensure security in software systems. We have described
each one as a program transformation. In some cases, these program transfor-
mations are easy to perform manually. In others, they can be automated. As we
present our transformations, we will also discuss what parts can be automated
and how. Some program transformations require making signiﬁcant changes to
the system, for instance adding a new security component. Building the logic
to automate such a change in a tool might not be needed for a single system,
since the transformation needs to be applied only once, but automating it will
produce a reusable tool that can be applied to other systems. Other transforma-
tions are small but ubiquitous, for example replacing unsafe function calls with
secure calls. Although the choice of the replacement functions should be left to
the developers of each system, such a transformation should also be applied by
a tool, rather than manually, to avoid programmer mistakes. Yet other trans-
formations can be performed with already existing tools. Whenever such tools
are available, we will discuss how these tools can perform the automated part of
a transformation. We believe that the applying these program transformations
can add security to existing systems.
The major contribution of this paper are:
(1) The deﬁnition of security-oriented program transformations as a mechanism
to retroﬁt security to existing systems.
(2) A large collection of security-oriented program transformations that solve
the most important kinds of security problems.
(3) A system for classifying security-oriented program transformations.
This paper has two parts. The ﬁrst part introduces security-oriented pro-
gram transformations. Next we present our classiﬁcation system that charac-
terizes common aspects of these transformations. This classiﬁcation will serve
to structure the catalog presented in the second part of this paper. We pro-
vide examples of several security-oriented program transformations, how they
are designed, how they are applied and how they are composed to add defense
in depth [38] to a system. We also evaluate our catalog and review related work.
The second part of this paper (the Appendix) describes our current catalog
of security-oriented program transformations. We give a brief summary of all the
program transformations in our catalog. For each transformation, we describe
what a developer has to specify and what the tool does. Every transformation
that we have included works—and most of them could be automated.
2 Security-oriented Program Transformations
A program transformation is a function that maps programs to programs. A
security-oriented program transformation maps programs to security-augmented
programs, i.e. it introduces a security solution to make programs more secure.
The catalog described in this paper contains forty two transformations. The
Appendix contains a summary of each of them. For their full description, see
http://netfiles.uiuc.edu/mhafiz/www/sopt.pdf.
Each program transformation is a sequence of steps. Some of the steps are
easy to automate, either with existing tools or with simple tools that we have
built. But some other steps cannot be easily automated, because their details
are diﬀerent in each system. Program transformations in our catalog separate
the steps of applying transformations that are manual (policy) from the steps
that are part of an automated tool (mechanism). The separation makes it a lot
easier to design automated tools because a tool does not need to have a detailed
understanding of application logic.
Program transformations are “general purpose”, but no transformation will
work with every program. They usually expect a certain programming language
or a certain platform, because the exact details are language-speciﬁc. By general
purpose transformations, we mean that a transformation for a certain program-
ming language should be applicable to all programs written in that language.
Our security-oriented program transformations make structural changes that
do not depend on detailed understanding of the application logic. This property
makes them similar to refactoring [10]. Both refactoring and security-oriented
program transformations are types of program transformations. However, pro-
gram transformations for security are not behavior-preserving the way refac-
torings are. A security-oriented program transformation preserves the correct
behavior and ﬁxes the incorrect behavior caused by a security vulnerability.
Our program transformations are behavior-preserving when the system is used
correctly; they preserve the good path behavior. Only attackers see change in
the behavior, because security-oriented program transformations eliminate the
source of vulnerabilities the attackers want to exploit.
Security-oriented program transformations could be automated, because they
separate policy from mechanism. To use a security-oriented program transfor-
mation, a developer has to follow three steps–1) identify the program points
where to apply a transformation, 2) determine which transformation to apply,
and 3) use a tool to automatically transform the program. The ﬁrst two tasks are
manual; a developer identiﬁes where to apply a transformation and which trans-
formation to apply. Usually, a developer supplies these parameters to a program
transformation with a manual speciﬁcation. Consider a program transformation
that minimizes the number of entry points, which we call Single Access Point.
If all the places where input enters a system could be consolidated into a few
points, then all the necessary checks of the input could be performed at those
entry points. But how does one minimize the number of entry points? Once all
the entry points of a system are identiﬁed, it is possible through a series of code
edits and refactorings to merge entry points together to produce a minimal num-
ber of points. However, identifying all entry points is not easy to automate. It
is better if a developer manually speciﬁes the entry points. A developer’s spec-
iﬁcation is the policy. The tools implement the mechanism; they automatically
execute structural changes. With this separation, program transformations can
automate new security solutions without the need to encode deep understanding
of program behavior in the transformation. In the example, a tool will automate
the code edits and refactorings required to minimize the number of entry points.
All of our program transformations separate policy from mechanism in this
way. For each program transformation described in the Appendix, we describe
what a developer has to specify and what the tool does to apply the changes.
3 Deriving the Catalog
Our catalog of forty two security-oriented program transformations derives from
earlier work on security patterns. We have been maintaining a comprehensive
catalog of security patterns [13]. The catalog lists ninety one patterns that ap-
pear in many books, catalogs and papers on security patterns. Many of the
transformations in this catalog are derived from security patterns.
To produce a catalog of security-oriented program transformations from a
security pattern catalog, we performed three steps. The ﬁrst step is to select the
candidate security patterns that could be described as program transformations.
Not all security patterns are about code and software design. There are secu-
rity patterns for asset evaluation, risk assessment, and threat modeling [30] that
describe a process, and could not be described as a program transformations
of software artefacts. Also, security patterns that describe security principles
such as Defense in Depth [38] do not have any corresponding program transfor-
mations. Program transformations do not exist for yet another set of security
patterns that are about hardware, such as which ﬁrewall to use in which con-
text [30]. Removing all these security patterns from the original list of ninety
one, we have selected thirty six patterns that could be described as program
transformations.
The second step is deﬁning the mechanics of the transformation. The map-
ping from a security pattern to a program transformation is not trivial. A security
pattern provides a high-level description of a security solution. It does not de-
scribe how to implement the solution nor the steps to transform a program to
introduce the solution. For each candidate security pattern, we had to identify
the implementation method and then describe the steps of program transforma-
tion. For example, a Safe Data Buﬀer [15] security pattern provides a solution
to prevent buﬀer overﬂow attacks. Buﬀer overﬂow occurs because an unsafe lan-
guage such as C do not check buﬀer bounds while performing a buﬀer operation.
The Safe Data Buﬀer pattern says that one should check for length information
before performing any operation on the data. It does not give any hint of how to
implement the solution. The lessons from this pattern has been implemented by
a number of safe string libraries (e.g. strlcat and strlcpy [24], libmib library [8],
ISO/IEC 24731 [19], libsafe library [2] etc) and safe data types [27, 15]. We have
described the solution as a Safe Library Replacement transformation. The trans-
formation ﬁnds all instances of an unsafe library in a program and replaces each
instance with a corresponding safe library.
The third step is ﬁnding how to automate a program transformation. Not
all program transformations can be automated. But if a program transforma-
tions could be automated, making it a part of automated tools will make it
easier for the developers to apply them. Some program transformations could
be completely automated, but most transformations require some manual inter-
vention. Building automated program transformation tools would beneﬁt if the
tools make structural changes only, similar to automated refactoring tools. We
refer to this as the separation of policy (manual speciﬁcation) from mechanism
(structural change).
Not all the transformations in the catalog derive from security patterns.
Program transformations to create a message digest, or a message signature
describe how classes of Java or .NET security API could be composed to per-
form the tasks. The full listing of the catalog in the Appendix cites the source
of all transformations. A detailed description of how we created the program
transformation catalog from the original pattern catalog is available at http:
//netfiles.uiuc.edu/mhafiz/www/transformation-catalog.pdf.
4 Categorizing Security-oriented Program
Transformations
Security-oriented program transformations vary in their impact on an existing
program—some transformations make changes at a few parts of a program, oth-
ers aﬀect many parts of a program, while there are program transformations
that go beyond the boundaries of a single system. These categories could be
used as a scheme to organize the transformations. Another scheme to organize
the transformations in the catalog is the type of change they make. Yet an-
other scheme is based on the type of vulnerability that is ﬁxed by a program
transformation. Categorizing program transformations based on these common
properties makes it easy to refer to families of related transformations, to learn
the transformations in the catalog, and to ﬁnd new transformations.
We have organized our catalog based on three orthogonal criteria, impact
of transformation, vulnerability ﬁxed by transformation, and type of transforma-
tion. Combining these criteria gives a three-dimensional model for categorizing
transformations. To present them in a readable format, we have broken up the
catalog into ﬁve tables corresponding to ﬁve types of vulnerabilities. Tables 1
through 5 list the transformations.
Impact of transformation denotes the impact of applying a transformation on
a codebase. We have identiﬁed four categories of impact that a transformation
has on a codebase.
(1) Small, infrequent change. Some transformations have a small footprint. The
code change for each instance of a transformation is small; also the frequency
of these changes in the total codebase is small.
(2) Small, frequent change. The code changes for an instance of a transformation
might be small, but the changes occur at many places of the code.
(3) Large change. These transformations make large changes on a codebase.
(4) Change beyond system boundary. Some transformations require code change
beyond system boundaries, i.e. in multiple network elements.
The goal of a program transformation is to ﬁx a single (or maybe more) type
of security vulnerability. A versatile catalog should contain program transfor-
mations that ﬁx many important types of vulnerabilities. OWASP [28] identiﬁes
top ten security vulnerabilities that aﬀect modern systems. They are, unvali-
dated input (A1), broken access control (A2), broken authentication and session
management (A3), cross site scripting ﬂaws (A4), buﬀer overﬂows (A5), injec-
tion ﬂaws (A6), improper error handling (A7), insecure storage (A8), denial of
service (A9), and insecure conﬁguration management (A10). Among these, cross
site scripting (A4), buﬀer overﬂows (A5) and injections ﬂaws (A6) fall under
the umbrella of unvalidated input (A1). Securing storage (A8) has two concerns:
deciding the appropriate cryptographic solution and implementing proper access
control with the cryptographic solution. Deciding the appropriate cryptographic
solution is entirely a manual activity that is part of requirement engineering,
while implementing proper access control is the same as ﬁxing access control
vulnerability (A2). Securing conﬁguration management (A10) is related to soft-
ware maintenance rather than design. Thus our classiﬁcation has ﬁve distinct
types of vulnerabilities that can be solved by modifying source code:
(1) Unvalidated Input
(2) Broken Access Control
(3) Broken Authentication
(4) Improper Error Handling
(5) Denial of Service
Another criteria for grouping transformations is based on the type of change
they introduce to the system. We have identiﬁed four types of code changes.
They are:
(1) Add Component. Instantiate a component that adds a new security func-
tionality and plug it in the existing component.
(2) Limit. Set a limit on the resources and check it before a resource is used.
(3) Mutate data. Change encoding of data, validate data, or rectify data to
remove data related security vulnerabilities.
(4) Distribute. Break up a single entity into smaller parts, e.g. distribute a task
between smaller subtasks, or break up a process into multiple processes.
The following sections describe the categories in greater detail and provide
examples of transformations in each category. We describe them in the same way
they are presented in Table 1 through 5. We describe each type of vulnerability,
and highlight some transformations from each category.
4.1 Unvalidated Input
Insuﬃciently validating input data is the root cause of various types of injection
attacks, which is one of the most often exploited security vulnerabilities. We dis-
cuss security-oriented program transformations that deal with injection attacks
in detail in our previous work [14].
Small, Small, Large Change
infrequent frequent change beyond
change change boundaries
T7. Add Perimeter
Add Filter
T25. Message
Intercepting
Gateway
Limit T13. chroot Jail T32. Safe Library
Replacement
T20. Fuzzing T17. Decorated
Mutate data Filter
T30. Randomization
T42. Unique Location
Distribute for Each Write
Request
Table 1. Security-oriented Program Transformations for Unvalidated Input
Most security-oriented program transformations in this category are about
applying input validation checks to program variables. Each transformation mod-
iﬁes a small amount of code, speciﬁcally, the code where input data is received.
Add component. Since the change has a small footprint, developers have
the option of applying a transformation manually or using tools. For example,
a developer can Add Perimeter Filter component at the system entry point
manually or automatically. This transformation should be applied to a system
that has few entry points, i.e. few places where input data enters the system.
(To ensure that a system has few entry points, it is beneﬁcial to apply the Single
Access Point transformation ﬁrst.) The code change involves adding a ﬁlter class
or component and calling it from each entry point. A tool can automatically add
the component and the call to it given a developer has identiﬁed the system entry
points. The transformation made by a tool does not require deep understanding
of program behavior that is required to identify the entry points.
Limit. A somewhat diﬀerent transformation is the chroot Jail transformation,
which limits a Unix process from writing beyond a directory hierarchy. This is
an atypical transformation, because it requires very few changes in the source
code or binary. Instead, the program transformation creates a jail environment
for a process. The transformation analyzes a program and ﬁnds its dependencies
on static and dynamic libraries, ﬁle descriptors, etc. The tool could also properly
add the chroot calls in the source code so that ﬁle descriptors are closed across
the call, the privilege of the calling process is lowered, and the shared resources
have proper permissions.
Mutate data. Program transformations that mutate data require developers
to specify the policies that modify (or mutate) input data. A Decorated Filter
transformation adds input validation policies, speciﬁed by developers, to dec-
orate [11] an input variable. These policies are injection attack speciﬁc; thus
they can be easily extended as new injection attacks emerge. A tool for this
transformation is very simple – it automates the Moving Embellishment to Dec-
orator [10] refactoring, which is a purely structural change. A tool does not need
Small, Small, Large Change
infrequent frequent change beyond
change change boundaries
T8. Add Reference T4. Add Auth- T27. Parallelized
Add Monitor orization Link
Component T21. Guarded Enforcer T25. Secure
Object Pipe
T15. Controlled T36. Secure
Process Resource
Limit Creation Pooling
T14. Controlled
Object Factory
T22. Least Privilege
T24. Message Digest
Creation
T38. Signature
Generation
Mutate data T18. Encryption/
Decryption
T34. Secure Message
Router
Distribute T28. Partitioning
Table 2. Security-oriented Program Transformations for Broken Access Control
deep understanding of program behavior since it does not identify by itself where
to apply the transformations or which input validation policies to apply. These
are speciﬁed by the developers.
Distribute. Some program transformations break a single point of failure into
multiple entities. A Unique Location for Each Write Request transformation
prevents multiple processes from writing to one ﬁle by creating a unique ﬁle for
each write request. This transformation creates a temporary ﬁle for each write
task, writes data to it, and saves the ﬁle with a unique name. It also modiﬁes
the ﬁle read mechanism for the data consumers.
4.2 Broken Access Control
Failure to restrict users properly allows attackers to access other users’ accounts,
view sensitive ﬁles, or use unauthorized functions. Program transformations that
prevent access problems follow various strategies, e.g. introduce an authoriza-
tion component, partition to a lower privilege level, or employ cryptographic
techniques to keep data conﬁdential. Many members of this category are large
transformations, some transformations go beyond a system boundary and need
to be applied to multiple systems.
Add component. Adding an authorization component at the system entry
point is similar to adding a perimeter ﬁlter, because both apply to the system
entry point and both add a component or a group of classes and delegate the
task to the composition. However, the impact of change is much larger for an Add
Authorization Enforcer transformation, because it involves composing a lot of
classes. For example, an authorization component based on Java Authentication
and Authorization Service (JAAS) framework creates a collection of permissions
and stores it in the credential set of a subject. Composing an authorization
component involves composing many classes, e.g. classes describing a subject, its
principals, their permissions, permission collection, credentials, request context.
Mutate data. Another type of transformation that indirectly helps access con-
trol is to apply cryptographic operations to program data. For example, a devel-
oper might specify the algorithm used for calculating a message digest of a data
value, and a Message Digest Creation transformation automatically introduces
calls to a security API to calculate the digest.
Limit. Sometimes enforcing stricter constraints result in better access control.
A Secure Resource Pooling transformation modiﬁes the manager process of a
resource pool to limit the lifetime of worker processes in the pool. A developer
has to specify a policy that determines the lifetime of worker processes, e.g.
number of times a process can serve, number of times a process remains idle,
total amount of time a process is in the pool etc. A tool could automatically
modify the manager process to add the policy.
Distribute. Distribution of tasks could lower the required privilege level re-
quired for a process which eventually improves access control. Partitioning [38]
a monolithic process into multiple processes lowers the privilege level required to
run a process. It also allows better privilege separation because each process can
run with separate user ids. A Partitioning transformation accepts a process and a
speciﬁcation of functional distribution from developers and distributes the tasks
of a program into multiple logical partitions so that processes in each partition
run with a single privilege level. There are tools available for speciﬁcation-driven
partitioning, but usually their goal is to get better performance [31] [18] [34] [35],
better reliability [16] or better energy consumption [39]. These tools automate
the mechanism for remote references, such as replacing method calls with remote
method calls, direct object references with proxy references etc.
Large transformations are harder to automate and they require more detailed
speciﬁcation from the developers. For a Partitioning transformation, a developer
has to specify the functionality distribution, interface, privilege level and inter-
process communication mechanism. A speciﬁcation for an Add Authorization
Enforcer transformation has to include details about principals, requesting con-
text, permissions, etc.
4.3 Broken Authentication
Many security problems that are under the category of unvalidated input or bro-
ken access control are in fact problems with the authentication mechanism of a
system. Bad authentication allows an intruder in, who can then take advantage
of other vulnerabilities in the system. User authentication typically involves the
use of a userid and password. Stronger methods of authentication are commer-
cially available such as software and hardware based cryptographic tokens or
biometrics, but such mechanisms are prohibitively costly for most applications.
Most program transformations add large authentication components and del-
egate the task. In some cases, the components span multiple system boundaries.
Small, Small, Large Change
infrequent frequent change beyond
change change boundaries
T3. Add Auth- T37. Secure
encation Session
Add Enforcer Object
Component T16. Credential T40. Single Sign
Tokenizer On Delegate
T6. Add Password
Synchronizer
Limit T1. Add Account
Lockout
Table 3. Security-oriented Program Transformations for Broken Authentication
Add component. Similar to authorization components, authentication compo-
nents are added at the entry point of a system. A program transformation adds a
component and delegates a task to it. Composing an authentication component
has to keep track of a lot of things. For example, an authentication component
based on JAAS framework creates a login module that takes the login decision.
A developer has to specify how the credentials, e.g. username and password, are
passed to the login module. A login module decides on the authentication, and
initializes a subject. It populates a subject with principals and credentials that
is used by authorization components at diﬀerent points in the system.
Large program transformations require large user speciﬁcations. For an Add
Authentication Enforcer transformation that creates a username and password
authentication component, a developer has to specify where the inputs are com-
ing from, where and how a system stores username password pairs, how the
authentication decision is made, and what principals and credentials to add
given an authentication attempt is successful. It is diﬃcult for a user to pro-
vide all these speciﬁcations for an automated tool; at the same time parsing a
complex speciﬁcation would make a tool complex. A simpler alternative for a
tool would be to create a default authentication component and let the devel-
opers customize it for their speciﬁc needs. This can be done by creating hook
methods, or by adding a Strategy [11]. Frameworks such as JGuard compose au-
thentication components based on user-provided speciﬁcation. We will provide
the details when we describe an example in section 5.
Limit. Even solid authentication mechanisms can be undermined by ﬂawed
credential management functions, such as password change. An Add Account
Lockout transformation adds a limit on the number of login attempts. Unless
the authentication component is created following a standard framework (JAAS
or .NET), it is diﬃcult to add this check automatically. However, since it is only
done at a few places of a system, it could be done manually.
4.4 Improper Error Handling
Improper handling of errors introduces a variety of security problems. Attackers
use this weakness for launching reconnaissance attacks. If a system shows internal
error messages such as stack traces, database dumps, and error codes to users,
Small, Small, Large Change
infrequent frequent change beyond
change change boundaries
T2. Add Audit
Add Interceptor
Component T5. Add Error
Message
Suppressor
T33. Secure Logger
Mutate data T19. Exception
Shielding
Table 4. Security-oriented Program Transformations for Improper Error Han-
dling
attackers learn the implementation details that should never be revealed. An
example is passing a malformed SQL query to get information about the database
schema, popularly known as the blind sql injection attack.
Program transformations to ﬁx improper error handling are small. They typ-
ically mutate error messages to suppress internal information.
Error messages should nevertheless be stored internally with all the available
details. There are program transformations that add a logging component and
delegate logging task to it. Both error message mutation and error detail storage
changes occur frequently in a system.
Mutate data. Applications frequently generate error notiﬁcations, e.g. out
of memory, null pointer exceptions, system call failure, database unavailable,
network timeout, malformed input, etc. An Exception Shielding transformation
is similar to a Decorated Filter transformation, because both decorate [11] a
variable with various policies for suppressing error messages. Their diﬀerence
is in the context: while the latter applies validation policies on input variables,
the former applies suppression policies on outputs that are generated. Another
transformation is to add a component that intercepts all types of error messages
and apply policies globally (Add Error Message Suppressor). The advantage of
the Exception Shielding transformation is that the suppression policies could be
ﬁne-tuned for each input.
A developer has to specify which output variables to intercept and the error
suppression policy. A tool could contain a library of policies from which a de-
veloper selects the appropriate ones for a context. The library of policy should
be extensible so that developers could add their organization-speciﬁc custom
policies. One example policy is to group multiple error messages and provide a
generic error message. Consider, two error cases in an access control context–a
request for a non-existent ﬁle versus a request for an existing ﬁle for which a user
does not have access permissions. Typically, separate error messages are gener-
ated for separate error cases. Unifying the error messages to a generic message
will not reveal to a requester whether a ﬁle exists in a system or not.
Add component. Adding components for keeping track of internal error mes-
sages and internal states during execution indirectly help in error handling.
Adding a simple logging component requires a small change. However, features
Small, Small, Large Change
infrequent frequent change beyond
change change boundaries
Add T23. Message
Component Caching
Limit T31. Resource T11. Batched
Management Tasks
T26. Parallelized T9. Add Replicated
Distribute Functionality System
T10. Add Standby
Table 5. Security-oriented Program Transformations for Denial of Service
such as message digest, signature, encryption could be added for producing more
secure logs. Eventually a logging component could be quite complex and large
if these additional transformations are applied on a logging component.
4.5 Denial of Service
Denial of Service in software is diﬀerent from a denial of service attack on the
network, a.g. a SYN ﬂood attack. The primary goal of DoS attackers on software
is to consume all of some required resource to prevent legitimate users from
using the system. Another type of attack is to deliberately crash a component to
make it unavailable. Strategies to survive these attacks vary; sometimes systems
should be parsimonious and enforce a limit, while at other times they should
act generous and use redundancy. The impact of the program transformations
varies from small localized changes to modifying multiple systems.
Add component. Attackers typically send multiple messages with garbage
payload to overload CPU and memory. At the system entry point, a separate
component could be added by an Message Caching transformation that inter-
cepts incoming messages, looks for replayed messages, and drops them. However,
the policies used to determine a replayed message should be very conservative,
because it is diﬃcult to distinguish a good traﬃc ﬂood from a bad traﬃc ﬂood.
Limit. There are program transformations that make large change in code.
One such change creates parallel threads of execution in the hope that at least
one thread survives a crash attempt. Some changes, on the other hand, are
parsimonious on resource usage. A Batched Tasks transformation adds a task
queue at a program point that stores tasks and performs them in a batch.
Distribute. Redundancy is a common method to ﬁght against DoS attacks
that results in changes beyond system boundaries. For example, the Add Repli-
cated System transformation results in duplicating the functionality of a system
throughout a network. The developer speciﬁes which parts of the system to
distribute, the number of copies, and their location. The transformation makes
copies of system components and creates an additional load balancing compo-
nent. The programs that communicate with the component also have to change.
The larger transformations require a lot of speciﬁcation. Even with the spec-
iﬁcation, the scope of automation is very limited.
4.6 Miscellaneous Program Transformations
There are a few program transformations that could not be classiﬁed with our
categorization scheme.
Some program transformation solve more than one vulnerability. For ex-
ample, a Single Access Point transformation centralizes the access points of a
system. It pulls up all methods [10] that provide an entry point to a new com-
ponent that is a Fac¸ade [11]. The way to implement this transformation for a
non-object oriented system is to create a wrapper component and add a Least
Privilege transformation to lower its privilege level. This program transforma-
tion has a large impact, however, it provides a framework to solve authentication,
authorization and input validation problems and does not ﬁt in one category.
After a Single Access Point transformation is applied to minimize the access
points, a Policy Enforcement Point transformation is applied to create a sep-
arate component. The access point delegates all authentication, authorization
and input validation requests to this component. The policy enforcement point
sequentially calls authentication enforcer, authorization enforcer and perimeter
ﬁlter components to perform the tasks. The separation of these calls in the ac-
cess points allow them to run with lower privilege level. The policy enforcement
point component is a Mediator [11] between components. A Policy Enforcement
Point transformation has a small impact, and it only applies at a few program
points. It could be classiﬁed in the ‘add component’ category. However, it ﬁxes
authentication, authorization and input validation vulnerabilities; hence it does
not ﬁt in one category.
Two other transformations that do not ﬁt cleanly in one category are Check-
pointed System and Single Threaded Fac¸ade. This brings the total number of
transformations to forty two.
5 Applying Security-oriented Program Transformations
In this section, we will describe how a security-oriented program transformation
could be applied to add authentication and input validation features to an ex-
isting software. Each program transformation is platform and language speciﬁc;
we assume that the transformations are applied on a Java program on Windows
platform. We also assume that the authentication scheme to be added is the
ubiquitous username and password based authentication scheme.
Suppose, an imaginary developer Alice has a Java program that connects to
a hostname and a port via a socket. It connects to two hostname/port pairs
and uses the data received from one connection to query an SQL database and
the data received from another connection to query an LDAP database. Alice
designed the program for the employees of her company; everybody was trusted,
everybody had the same rights, hence there was no need for authenticating users.
Now, Alice has to retroﬁt authentication, authorization, and input validation,
because her company is planning to let external users use the program.
Let us follow Alice’s thought process. The ﬁrst thing to consider is where to
add the new authentication, authorization and input validation features. Since,
Fig. 1. Classes added by a Policy Enforcement Point transformation
her program has two separate methods for socket connection (henceforward,
we will refer to them as the two access points), she could apply the Add Au-
thentication Enforcer, Add Authorization Enforcer and Add Perimeter Filter
transformations in the two places of the program. But applying program trans-
formations in this manner might open more chances of errors. For example, if
one method is patched later, the programmer writing the patch needs to re-
member to ﬁx the other method too. This can be avoided, if Alice minimizes
the access points of the program to one place by applying the Single Access
Point transformation. This transformation is usually followed by a Policy En-
forcement Point transformation. A policy enforcement point provides a single
check point for authentication, authorization and input validation. Alice could
then apply Add Authentication Enforcer, Add Authorization Enforcer and Add
Perimeter Filter transformations (we will describe here how the authentication
and perimeter ﬁlter components are added). The perimeter ﬁlter applies global
input validation policies, but many other validation policies are input-speciﬁc.
Hence Alice could apply the Decorated Filter transformation on several places
of the program.
We will describe these ﬁve program transformations—Single Access Point,
Policy Enforcement Point, Add Authentication Enforcer, Add Perimeter Filter
and Decorated Filter transformation. These program transformations are applied
in this sequence.
The two socket connections are in separate methods in two separate classes.
Alice selects these methods as the target of a Single Access Point transformation.
The transformation pulls up the methods [10] to a new class. However, the
methods to be pulled up may not share a common superclass. In that case, a
program transformation might create a common superclass, or give each of them
a component and create a common superclass for those components. The new
class is the uniﬁed system access point. For the subsequent transformations, this
will act as the base.
Next, Alice selects the AccessPoint class created in the previous step and
applies a Policy Enforcement Point transformation. Figure 1 shows the classes
added by the transformation. The AccessPoint class delegates authentication
request to an AuthenticationEnforcer class. This class is a placeholder and
Fig. 2. Classes added by an Add Authentication Enforcer transformation
could be initialized to return a negative value by default. This class is the starting
point of the next transformation in our list that creates an username/password-
based authentication component. Similarly, default classes are added for an au-
thorization component and a perimeter ﬁlter component.
In the next step, Alice replaces the AuthenticationEnforcer with a group
of classes that perform username/password based authentication (see Figure
2). The Add Authentication Enforcer transformation composes the classes of
the JAAS framework to provide a default authentication scheme. In our ex-
ample, Alice speciﬁes authentication type (username/password), source of user
inputs, authentication knowledge base (username/password store), and the out-
come of a successful authentication (which principals and credentials are added
to the authenticated subject). The AuthenticationEnforcer creates a new
LoginContext instance and calls its login method. This creates a new Subject
representing the authentication requester and passes it to a LoginModule imple-
mentation. For this example, a WindowsNTLoginModule is provided by the JAAS
framework. It implements two methods—the login method decides on the au-
thentication, and the commit method populates the subject with appropriate
principals and credentials when the authentication is successful. User inputs are
collected through the implementers of the CallbackHandler interface. The pro-
gram transformation provides an implementation of a default strategy which
will most likely be modiﬁed. Alice could apply an Add Strategy [20] refactoring
and add a custom implementation later. Similarly, the authentication algorithm
in a customized implementation of the LoginModule interface could be a Strat-
egy [11] that developers could extend. The Add Authentication Enforcer trans-
formation provides a default implementation only; Alice then customizes to ﬁt
the application speciﬁc requirements.
Next, Alice applies the Add Perimeter Filter transformation to extend the
default implementation of PerimeterFilter class. She selects a list of input
validation policies and the program transformation adds ﬁlters that implement
the policies to the PerimeterFilter class. They can be added as a Collection,
or by embellishing the PerimeterFilter class with a Decorator [11].
Fig. 3. Classes added by a Add Perimeter Filter transformation
Some policies are input speciﬁc. Alice applies these policies on the particular
instances of variables. She chooses the ﬁlters from a list of implemented poli-
cies for each input variable. The policies for SQL injection and LDAP injection
are diﬀerent. The program transformation adds the policies to an input variable
by using Decorators [11]. Figure 3 describes how a string variable is decorated
with policies that remove SQL injection attack vectors. The string input vari-
able becomes encapsulated in the abstract AbstractStringContainer class. Its
concrete instance UnsafeString becomes the target of input validation policies.
A Single Access Point transformation is small, it could be done manually.
But the other transformations require writing a lot of new code, and a signiﬁcant
portion of the code involves composing classes of a security framework to create
a component. Alice could use a tool that automates these boring details. In each
of these cases, Alice speciﬁes the changes that need to be made, and a tool makes
the changes.
6 Evaluation
The evaluation of the usefulness of any catalog of solutions depends on two
aspects—how much do the members of the catalog cover a problem area, and
how often are the solutions used. Evaluation of our catalog along any of these
aspects is an ambitious venture. We will describe why and nevertheless provide
our argument in favor of the catalog.
6.1 Coverage
Making a quantitative analysis of what percentage of security problems does our
catalog cover is hard because the deﬁnition of security and security solutions is
fuzzy. Security is an emergent property; it is unlikely that one can add security
to a system by adding a component or by modifying code in one part of a system.
Hence, any one particular program transformation, such as Add Authentication
Enforcer does not solve all authentication problems; it only contributes to the
overall security of the system. Nevertheless, transformations in our catalog cover
the most relevant security problems faced by today’s developers.
Our program transformation catalog originates from the analysis of both
the problem domain and the solution domain of security. We have analyzed
various reports on vulnerability trend analysis [6] [29] [33] [36] [37] to identify
the most relevant security problems. On the other hand, our comprehensive
security pattern catalog compiles the solutions that experts use to solve security
problems. Combining these two dimensions ensure that our catalog includes
transformations that provide real solutions for real problems.
We have surveyed the Bugtraq [5] list in the ﬁrst week of September 2008.
54% of the vulnerabilities in that week were some form of input validation prob-
lems, 13% were related with bad authentication and bad access control, 17% were
denial of service problems, 1% were error handling problems, and 15% were mis-
cellaneous other problems or combinations of the the aforementioned problems.
In reality, the partitioning is not mutually exclusive, 33% of the denial of service
problems in the survey could be solved by some sort of input validation. Our
program transformation catalog contains transformations that could be used to
ﬁx all these diﬀerent types of vulnerabilities (not the actual instances of vul-
nerabilities). There were 28 instances of buﬀer overﬂow vulnerabilities aﬀecting
software from 22 diﬀerent vendors. We could not analyze 9 instances that aﬀect
proprietary software. 17 of the remaining 19 instances can be solved by apply-
ing the Safe Library Replacement transformation. In the remaining two cases,
buﬀer overﬂow vulnerabilities originate from direct manipulation of pointers.
Also, there were 34 SQL injection and 21 cross-site scripting attack instances
that could be solved by Decorated Filter transformation. Other problems origi-
nating from unvalidated inputs (injection attacks) and improper error handling
could also be solved by transformations in our catalog [14]. The authentica-
tion and authorization related transformations in the catalog could be used to
add new components, or strengthen existing components, that could eradicate
most of the problems originating from broken authentication and broken access
control.
Another aspect is that not all transformations in our catalog has a one-to-
one relationship with vulnerabilities. Many security problems have their roots in
bad authentication and access control, but they manifest in other ways. Trans-
formations to add an authentication, authorization component, or a partitioning
transformation does not solve any one problem; they prevent other vulnerabil-
ities from occurring. Hence the protection provided by our catalog is stronger
than that suggested by the coverage ﬁgures in the previous paragraph.
6.2 Usefulness
In order to evaluate how often a security solution is used, or which transforma-
tions are more useful than others, one has to build tools for all of them. Then
again, the tools will be platform speciﬁc and programming language speciﬁc,
factors that might impact their usability. We believe that it is unreasonable to
expect researchers to build tools for every platform. Building a tool for a single
application is usually not cost eﬀective, so it is unreasonable to expect appli-
cation developers to do it either. It will need to be done by platform and tool
vendors, who can amortize the cost over many users. Only that would provide a
useful framework on which a usefulness study could be done.
Two studies of the way refactoring tools are used [26] [25] report that the
most popular refactorings are Rename, Extract Local Variable, Inline, Extract
Method, and Move. Of these, Rename, a very simple refactoring, is by far the
most popular. Note that all the cited refactorings are fairly small. If these results
can predict what are likely to be the most popular security-oriented program
transformations, they will probably be the simplest transformations, from the
Small impact category.
7 Related work
Security-oriented program transformations bridge two domains: security pat-
terns and tools for automating software redesign. Throughout this paper, we
have been comparing our program transformations and the ways they can be
automated to refactoring [10]. Refactoring is a technique for improving the qual-
ity of design and code by making changes that do not aﬀect the observable
behavior of the system. This property, called behavior preservation, is not a
part of security-oriented program transformations, because our goal is to im-
prove the external behavior of the system by making it more secure. But in all
the other aspects, our work parallels that of refactoring.
Our work is based on the continuously growing body of security patterns [40]
[4] [32] [30] [17] that document best practices in making systems secure. Today,
security patterns are not as easy to use as other software patterns, because
they do not oﬀer precise advice. The problems solved with security patterns are
more complex than other patterns. In order to provide general solutions, security
patterns are abstract and oﬀer only general guidance that can be turned into
complete solutions only by experienced security engineers.
Our work is related to software patterns in general, not just security pat-
terns. Our transformations also incorporate patterns from the fault tolerance
domain [16]. The relationship between security-oriented program transforma-
tions and security patterns is of the same type as between the Refactoring to
patterns [20] book and the design patterns [11]. Refactoring to patterns de-
scribes, step by step, how to introduce design patterns into the code by applying
a refactoring or a code edit at each step.
As a technique for describing how to modify software design and code,
security-oriented program transformations are similar to other software docu-
mentation techniques. Design fragments [9] is a technique for describing how to
use a software framework. It identiﬁes the constraints that a framework user
needs to meet in order to use it. These speciﬁcations are stored in the source
code, as annotations.
Possibly the easiest way to implement some of our transformations in tools is
to use aspect-orientation [21]. Logging and weaving in method calls to new com-
ponents are the poster children of AOP, so our transformations such as Secure
Logger, and most of the Add * transformations can be implemented with AOP
relatively easily. However, there are other transformations for which AOP does
not oﬀer immediate solutions, e.g. the transformations in the Distribute category.
Simple scripts or transformations based on abstract syntax tree manipulation are
other implementation alternatives for such tools.
8 Conclusion
Security-oriented program transformations show how to think about security
systematically. Since new kinds of security threats continue to appear, even sys-
tems that are currently being built to high security standards will eventually
need to be changed, and so will need security-oriented program transformations.
It is usually easier to solve a particular problem than to come up with a general
solution to all problems of a particular class. However, there are many fewer
general security solutions than there are security ﬂaws. Applying security solu-
tions deﬁned as transformations will be cheaper in the long run than ﬁxing every
security ﬂaw individually.
Our catalog will grow – in response to new classes of vulnerabilities – and
pro-actively, as more people use it and begin to look for missing pieces. The
next important step in exploring security-oriented program transformations will
be to study how diﬀerent transformations are related, for instance, by applying
them in sequences, as we illustrated in the Example section.
Security-oriented program transformations are ready to be used in practice.
They are a key to making and keeping our systems secure.
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Appendix. List of Transformations
Each transformation is summarized in three sentences.
1. The ﬁrst sentence summarizes the before and after of the transformation and
provides a reference to the source that ﬁrst described this security solution.
There are some program transformations that do not originate from security
patterns; some of these are program transformations that introduce a well-
known security feature (e.g. encryption, message digest etc.) while others are
new program transformations. These do not have any references.
2. The second sentence describes what a developer needs to specify (the policy).
3. The last sentence summarizes the structural changes that are made by the
tool that applies the transformation (the mechanism).
The transformations are listed in alphabetical order.
T1. Add Account Lockout. Introduce the functionality to limit the number
of unsuccessful password entry attempts [22]. A developer speciﬁes the authen-
tication component where the lockout policy is enforced. The transformation
inserts the checks which may be as simple as inserting a for loop with condi-
tional clause.
T2. Add Audit Interceptor. Introduce the functionality for collecting and
manipulating audit events [32]. A developer speciﬁes where to intercept data to
audit, and how to create audit data. The transformation adds an audit inter-
ceptor component with appropriate logic to create audit data, and delegates all
requests and responses through the component.
T3. Add Authentication Enforcer. Introduce the functionality for au-
thentication based on various authentication mechanism, such as username and
password, username and certiﬁcate, or kerberos tickets [32] [30] [17]. A devel-
oper speciﬁes the insertion point of an authentication component, source of input
data, authentication mechanism, and outcome of a successful or a failed authen-
tication. The transformation composes classes of a security framework (JAAS,
.NET etc) to create a component with the speciﬁed authentication mechanism,
and delegates authentication requests from the insertion point.
T4. Add Authorization Enforcer. Introduce the functionality of an access
controller [32] [30]. A developer speciﬁes the insertion point of an authorization
component, the subject of authorization passed to the component, and the au-
thorization policy. The transformation composes classes of a security framework
(JAAS, .NET etc) to create an authorization enforcer component, and delegates
access control requests from the insertion point.
T5. Add Error Message Suppressor. Introduce a component that inter-
cepts all error messages and suppresses the error messages based on some global
policy. A developer speciﬁes the interception point of error messages (e.g. inter-
cepting all write messages to stderr) and the policies applied to suppress error
messages. The transformation adds an interceptor component that applies the
suppression policies.
T6. Add Password Synchronizer. Introduce a component for synchro-
nizing user credentials across diﬀerent application systems [32]. A developer
identiﬁes the systems that use a password synchronization service. The trans-
formations creates the service as a hub between all the components.
T7. Add Perimeter Filter. Introduce a policy enforcement point at the
system entry point to validate data [32]. A developer speciﬁes where to insert a
perimeter ﬁlter and what policies to apply. The program transformation adds a
new perimeter ﬁlter component that applies policies to validate data and dele-
gates all input validation requests to the component.
T8. Add Reference Monitor. Introduce a process that intercepts all re-
quests for resources and validates access to them [30]. A developer speciﬁes the
requests to intercept and access control policies. The program transformation
adds a reference monitor component that applies access control policies.
T9. Add Replicated System. Replicate services at multiple points in the
network [4]. A developer identiﬁes the network points where replication is re-
quired and describes the workload balancing policy. The transformation creates
replicas at the network points and creates a workload management proxy at
those points; the proxy switches to another service when a service fails.
T10. Add Standby. Introduce backup components [4]. A developer speci-
ﬁes components for which standby components are required and points out what
state information of the original component are to be kept. The transformation
creates replicas and adds a monitor that transfers control to a standby compo-
nent when a component fails.
T11. Batched Tasks. Group similar requests and perform them together
rather than processing each request as soon as it arrives [15]. A developer speciﬁes
the program point that receives user requests. The transformation creates a
request pool to process requests in a batch.
T12. Checkpointed System. Periodically save important state information
so that a system can restart gracefully from a crash [4]. A developer speciﬁes
where the system checkpoints are and the state information to save at check-
points. The transformation introduces method calls to save information.
T13. chroot Jail. Constrain processes in a system to access only a portion of
the ﬁlesystem [15]. A developer speciﬁes: (1) the location of the chroot directory,
(2), the program to be jailed and the programs that communicate with it, (3)
the line number of the program where the chroot system call is to be inserted,
and (4) the privilege level of the writer and the reader process. The program
transformation creates a jail environment for a process and runs it inside a
chroot jail.
T14. Controlled Object Factory. Intercept new object creation requests
and explicitly assign the rights to the new object [30]. A developer speciﬁes the
rights to be associated with the critical objects in a system. The transformation
adds right checks at the object creation points.
T15. Controlled Process Creation. Rather than having a child process
automatically inherit all parent’s privileges, have the system assign to the child
process only the explicitly stated privileges [30]. A developer speciﬁes the parent
and child processes and the privileges to transfer. The transformation intercepts
a process creation system call and assigns the privileges to the child process.
T16. Credential Tokenizer. Introduce functionality for encapsulating dif-
ferent types of user credentials as a security token [32]. A developer speciﬁes the
types of tokens to use. The transformation creates a tokenizer that creates and
manages the security token.
T17. Decorated Filter. Associate additional checks with input variables
and apply them as a series of ﬁlters. A developer speciﬁes the target input
variable and the policies to be applied. The program transformation adds the
policies to an input variable by using the Decorator [11] pattern.
T18. Encryption/Decryption Encrypt or decrypt a message signature.
A developer speciﬁes the input data buﬀer, the parameters of the signature
algorithm, the key used to encrypt/decrypt a message, and the key encoding al-
gorithm. The transformation composes classes from a security framework (JCA,
JCE, .NET etc) to encrypt/decrypt the message.
T19. Exception Shielding. Introduce exceptions to indicate that the ap-
plication entered an unexpected state and at the same time obfuscate the error
messages to hide internal information [17]. A developer speciﬁes exception type,
insertion point and data obfuscation policy. The transformation inserts excep-
tions, as needed, and obfuscates the error messages produced by the exceptions
so that exceptions do not contain sensitive information or a detailed stack trace.
T20. Fuzzing. Extend the testing framework of the system with a com-
ponent that generates random data and runs the program with that data. A
developer speciﬁes the program insertion points where fuzzing tests are to be
applied. The transformation automatically adds the components in the testing
framework.
T21. Guarded Object If the supplier and the consumer of a resource are in
diﬀerent threads, make the context a part of the resource so that access control
decisions could be taken locally. A developer speciﬁes a resource to be protected
and the permissions associated with the resource. The transformation creates a
guarded object that encapsulates a resource and the permissions associated with
the resource.
T22. Least Privilege. Analyze a program to make sure that it runs with
the lowest privilege required to perform all its tasks [38]. No developer action
is necessary. The transformation automatically analyzes a program and identi-
ﬁes the lowest privilege level required; then it lowers the privilege level of the
program.
T23. Message Caching. Add a veriﬁcation mechanism for dropping re-
played packets [17]. A developer speciﬁes where at the program perimeter in-
coming messages are accepted as well as how to uniquely identify incoming mes-
sages. The transformation implements a message cache with replay detection
mechanism; it drops all the packets that have been replayed.
T24. Message Digest Creation. Calculate the message digest of a data
to prove message integrity. A developer speciﬁes the input data buﬀer, and the
message digest algorithm to be used. The transformation composes classes from
a security framework (JCA, JCE, .NET etc) to calculate message digest.
T25. Message Intercepting Gateway. Introduce functionality that san-
itizes the XML input before it enters the system [32]. No developer action is
necessary. The transformation creates an XML ﬁrewall in front of all the ac-
cess points in the system and sanitizes XML data; it’s a combination of Add
Perimeter Filter, Decorated Filter and Intercepting Web Agent transformations.
T26. Parallelized Functionality. Split functionality of a single component
among diﬀerent components that will perform it in parallel [4]. A developer spec-
iﬁes the critical functions to parallelize, and the interfaces. The transformation
extracts the functions into a component and creates parallel components.
T27. Parallelized Link. Rather than sending data to a single recipient over
a single link, send it over multiple links [12]. A developer identiﬁes the outgoing
links of a system. The transformation creates parallel links for each outgoing
link and distributes traﬃc evenly (or randomly) between links.
T28. Partitioning. Break up a monolithic system into multiple security
domains [38]. A developer speciﬁes how functions are distributed among parti-
tions, what the partition interfaces are, how the partitions communicate, and
what privilege levels they have. The transformation distributes the functions
based on the speciﬁcation, and modiﬁes the privilege levels according to the
speciﬁcation.
T29. Policy Enforcement Point. Introduce a component that centralizes
the application of authentication, authorization and input validation at the sys-
tem entry point [40] [32]. A developer speciﬁes the system entry point and the
authentication, authorization and input validation policies. The transformation
creates a policy enforcement component and components for authentication, au-
thorization and input validation. It delegates incoming requests to secure base
action component.
T30. Randomization. Make oﬀ-the-shelf components of the system unique
so that they do not fall prey of common vulnerabilities [22]. A developer speciﬁes
an artifact of the program (e.g. a data variable, instruction set) to be made
distinct. The transformation randomizes the artifact to make the system distinct
and thus less vulnerable.
T31. Resource Management. Introduce resource limit checks into source
code [15]. A developer identiﬁes the places where resource checks are to be in-
serted and the policies to apply. The transformation adds checks to the program
points.
T32. Safe Library Replacement. Replace unsafe functions in the code
with their safe versions [15]. For each unsafe function, a developer speciﬁes the
alternative safe function and the library that includes the function. The program
transformation ﬁnds all functions that need to be replaced, replaces unsafe func-
tions with suitable alternatives in all source ﬁles, and adds information about
the new library to conﬁguration ﬁles so that the new program compiles.
T33. Secure Logger. Introduce logging functionality into the system [32].
A developer speciﬁes the messages to log, and policies to retain conﬁdentiality
and integrity. The transformation adds a logging component that securely stores
logged data.
T34. Secure Message Router. In a distributed system, add intermediary
infrastructure that ensures that routing is done securely and each endpoint has
access only to the fragment of a message it’s authorized to examine [32]. A
developer speciﬁes security decisions and mechanisms for each endpoint. The
transformation creates a group of intermediaries that follow a protocol such
that they can route using selected portions of the message. At the sender end,
the transformation creates a policy enforcement point for outgoing messages.
T35. Secure Pipe. Introduce functionality to ensure the integrity and pri-
vacy of data sent over the wire [32]. A developer speciﬁes the content to be
transferred with a secure pipe and the policies to be used to initiate a secure
pipe. The transformation creates the pipe.
T36. Secure Resource Pooling. Introduce limits to the lifetime of daemon
processes [15]. A developer speciﬁes the parameters that determine the lifetime
of worker processes in a resource pool, e.g. the maximum time that a process
remains idle, the maximum number of requests that a process serves, or the
maximum life limit of a process since its creation. The transformation creates
a monitor process for the resource pool that kills processes in the pool and
replenishes it with new processes.
T37. Secure Session Object. Introduce a session object containing au-
thentication and authorization credentials that is passed across system bound-
aries [32]. A developer speciﬁes what to put inside a session object. The trans-
formation creates and manages the object.
T38. Signature Generation Generate a message signature. A developer
speciﬁes the input data buﬀer, the parameters of the signature algorithm, the
key used to sign a message, and the key encoding algorithm. The transformation
composes classes from a security framework (JCA, JCE, .NET etc) to generate
message signature.
T39. Single Access Point. Consolidate multiple locations where data en-
ters the system into as few access points as possible [40] [30]. A developer speciﬁes
the access points. The transformation makes an object-oriented Fac¸ade [11], or
introduces a wrapper component that has the same API.
T40. Single Sign On Delegate. Introduce a new component that performs
identity management and Single Sign On functionality [32]. A developer might
choose services. In that case, the transformation implements the services. Alter-
natively, the transformation automatically creates an SSO delegate with default
services.
T41. Single Threaded Fac¸ade. Make a multi-threaded perimeter process
single-treaded [15]. A developer speciﬁes the threads to remove. The transfor-
mation merges multiple threads of control into a single thread.
T42. Unique Location for Each Write Request. Create a unique ﬁle
for storing each request [15]. A developer speciﬁes the section of a program that
writes to a shared ﬁle and new ﬁle creation policy. The transformation modiﬁes
the write request so that a new ﬁle is created for each write request.
